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the standard buck-passer may be able to respond to Bedke’s objections and offer
a more unified, empirically adequate analysis of oughts and requirements.
The remaining papers in the volume make important contributions on a
wide range of metaethical issues. One recent hot topic in metaethics concerns
the debate over subjectivism and objectivism, or whether an agent’s normative
reasons are always grounded in facts about her motivational attitudes. David
Sobel defends a version of subjectivism that allows one’s future desires to ground
facts about one’s present reasons. This account, Sobel argues, avoids Derek
Parfit’s “Agony Argument.” Chris Heathwood defends objectivism against the
argument from matters of mere taste. Julia Markovits offers several fascinating
arguments for her favored version of subjectivism that are independent of many
of the standard philosophical motivations for subjectivism (e.g., reductive nat-
uralism, the Humean theory of motivation).
Richard Joyce and Jonas Olson examine moral error theory. Joyce defends
the surprising conclusion that several prominent metaethical theories, contrary
to initial appearances, commit their proponents to a moral error theory. Olson
argues that even if error theory is true, we should embrace genuine moral beliefs
and assertions rather than adopt a fictive attitude toward them as moral fic-
tionalists suggest.
Sarah McGrath’s insightful contribution examines several ways in which
experience plays a crucial role in the acquisition of moral knowledge, ways, she
argues, that are consistent with that knowledge being a priori. Campbell Brown
offers a new version of Frank Jackson’s argument for ethical descriptivism, one
that avoids making linguistic assumptions and is “metaphysical all the way
through” (206). Paul Katsafanas rejects the common assumption in action theory
that reflective actions are paradigm cases of agential activity. He argues that,
since motives can influence the process of reflection itself, reflection does not
suspend the effects of an agent’s motives. Finally, Ralph Wedgwood defends the
existence of instrumental rationality and, with characteristic care, delineates a
general account of what is essential to it.
Like the previous volumes in Shafer-Landau’s Oxford Studies in Metaethics,
volume 6 is characterized by careful argument and nuanced insight. It is essential
reading for anyone with prior interests in metaethics.
Alex Silk
University of Michigan
Sverdlik, Steven. Motive and Rightness.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 224. $55.00 (cloth).
This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the question of whether
the motive of an action ever affects its deontic status, and it will also be of
interest to normative ethicists in general. Many prominent moral philosophers,
including J. S. Mill, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross, hold that motives never
have deontic relevance, but Steven Sverdlik disagrees. His aim in this book is
to establish the truth of the following thesis and to understand why it is true:
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Motives Matter (MM): there is an action X such that if X were performed
from one motive it would fall into one deontic category and if X were
performed from another motive it would fall into a second deontic category
in virtue of this difference in motives. (4)
Sverdlik focuses on three deontic concepts: the obligatory, the wrong, and the
merely permissible. He supports MM by responding to some of the familiar
objections to the view that motive affects rightness (the consequentialist argu-
ment, the argument from the availability of motives, and the argument that moral
obligations are categorical). Sverdlik responds to these objections throughout the
book, but he doesn’t provide a positive argument in support of MM. Instead,
he relies heavily on our commonsense intuitions in a number of cases. Among
the examples of where motive sometimes makes a deontic difference, he men-
tions the desire for money (in relation to actions such as having consensual sex,
marrying someone, and putting a child up for adoption), cruelty, and racism.
An example of racism is where S refuses to sell her house to T because T is
black. This is intuitively wrong, but the same action would be permissible if it
were done from doubts about T’s creditworthiness (14–15).
Chapter 2 is devoted to conceptual issues. Sverdlik defines motive as “the
ultimate desire of the agent that explains its occurrence, or some feature of it”
(18). When a rational agent acts on ultimate and derived desires, there is a sort
of rational structure to her activity itself: “A motive establishes an end for an
agent, and she guides her activity accordingly. As she acts she will monitor her
activity to be sure that it is succeeding in achieving her end, and she will modify
it if it is not” (27). The bulk of the book (chaps. 3–7) is focused on the question
of which substantive moral theory can provide the most plausible explanation
for why motive sometimes makes a deontic difference.
In chapter 3, Sverdlik argues that “extrinsic” consequentialism can support
MM. He begins by discussing what he calls a “quasi-Millian argument” for the
falsity of MM, namely, that rightness depends on consequences; motives are not
consequences; therefore, motives cannot affect rightness. Sverdlik rejects this
argument, on the grounds that motives can affect consequences and thereby
also rightness. Whenever an agent consciously acts on a motive, it guides her
activity. It is therefore better to think of motive as contemporaneous with an
action, rather than as prior to it. It follows that when the same kind of action
is performed from two different motives, it may be performed in different ways,
and so the consequentialist cannot hold that all acts are such that they produce
the same narrow consequences regardless of motive (51–52). Sverdlik gives some
useful examples of how motives can have extrinsic value, in the remainder of
chapter 3.
In chapter 4, he considers a second response to the quasi-Millian argument,
namely, that rightness cannot depend only on consequences because the con-
sequentialist has to include in her calculation any intrinsic value that the action
itself has (49–51). Sverdlik discusses Thomas Hurka’s version of intrinsic con-
sequentialism, which claims that some motives (and psychological states more
generally) are intrinsically good and others are intrinsically bad (Virtue, Vice and
Value [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001]). Hurka argues that the value of
an attitude depends on the value of its object, so, for example, the love of
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knowledge for itself is intrinsically good because knowledge is intrinsically good.
Sverdlik rejects this view because desires are attitudes whose function is to change
the world in some way, suggesting that they are only extrinsically valuable. His
conclusion, then, is that only extrinsic consequentialism can explain why motive
sometimes makes a deontic difference.
The question of whether the Kantian can support MM is taken up in chap-
ters 5 and 6. Prichard and Ross’s claim is that “no actions that are obligatory
owe this status, even in part, to any facts about the motives from which they are
performed” (77). This claim does not entail that MM is false, for it is possible
for there to be wrong-making motives even if there are no obligation-making
motives. Sverdlik argues that the first (Universal Law) formulation of the Cat-
egorical Imperative does not provide us with a plausible explanation for why it
is wrong to refuse to shake someone’s hand from a racist motive (chap. 5). The
second statement—the Formula of Humanity—takes malice to be a wrong-mak-
ing motive, and hence supports MM, but does so only by sacrificing a largely
objective conception of deontic status, that is, by holding that any act from
malice is wrong (chap. 6).
In chapter 7, Sverdlik briefly examines the ways in which two versions of
virtue ethics treat the deontic relevance of motives. He focuses on Rosalind
Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelianism and Michael Slote’s agent-based virtue ethics
and argues that while the former cannot account for the deontic relevance of
motives, the latter can do so only by sacrificing the idea that there are any
objective obligations. He concludes that it is only extrinsic consequentialism that
can account for the deontic relevance of motives while also providing an ob-
jective conception of deontic status.
Chapter 8 deals with an important question concerning the availability of
motives: is it ever possible that at one time, an agent can choose to perform a
certain type of action from one motive or choose to perform that type of action
from another motive? In part 1, Sverdlik distinguishes four distinct psychological
abilities: the ability of an agent to recognize the normative reasons she has to
act, the ability to choose to act on those reasons, the ability to make the cor-
responding desires move her to act, and the ability to call forth certain distinctive
feelings. These abilities underlie the epistemic, affirmative, operative, and af-
fective availability of motives. While he grants that there are differences between
the availability of the sense of duty and the availability of other motives (e.g.,
sympathy and self-interest), there are fundamental similarities (149–66). In part
2, Sverdlik argues that extrinsic consequentialism will acknowledge that it is
possible at one time for an agent to act wrongly if she performs a certain action
from one motive, and permissibly if she performs it from another, but that these
cases are very rare (166–73). Finally, he argues that motives are also relevant to
obligation (chap. 9); in some situations, the very fact that we are “in the mood”
for doing something has a bearing on whether we ought to act. For example,
suppose there is an important piece of research that must be carried out and
there are a number of researchers available for the assignment. If S is interested
in the phenomenon to be investigated and the others are not, then S may be
obligated to undertake the assignment. He will be motivated to produce new
knowledge about the phenomenon as an end, whereas the others would not
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be. They would have to be provided with incentives in order to put the same
amount of effort into the investigation as S would (184).
The book is interesting, well organized, and written in a style that is clear
and accessible. I have three points of criticism, one about the overall aim and
argumentative structure of the book and two about the treatment of virtue ethics.
Sverdlik’s aim is to show that motives can have deontic relevance. This at first
appears to be a fairly controversial thesis, for as he notes, both consequentialists
and deontologists have important objections to the idea. For the thesis to be
true, it would seem, one has to find at least one example of a pair of actions
that are identical in every respect, except for the agent’s motive and the deontic
status of the actions. However, when Sverdlik clarifies his thesis, his aim appears
to be far more modest. He doesn’t claim that for MM to be true it has to be
shown that in any given case, the motive of an action is the only or complete
reason why it has a certain deontic status (4). But if he accepts that a complete
statement of the reason why an action is right or wrong may always include at
least one factor apart frommotive, then it is very likely that motive affects deontic
status only indirectly, that is, by sometimes affecting one or more of these other
factors (e.g., the consequences or nature of the action, or the circumstances
the agent finds himself in). This thesis—that motive can affect deontic status
indirectly—is far less controversial, and I don’t think there are very many people
who would deny it. Sverdlik provides a detailed argument in favor of the view
that extrinsic consequentialism can support MM. The conclusion is correct, but
obviously so. Few consequentialists, if any, would deny that motive can affect
consequences. Mill writes, for instance, that “the motive, that is, the feeling
which makes him will so to do, if it makes no difference in the act, makes none
in the morality” ( John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979],
18). Mill never claims that MM is false; what he claims is that the following thesis
is false:
There is an action X such that if X were performed from one motive it
would fall into one deontic category and if X were performed from another
motive it would fall into a second deontic category in virtue of this difference
in motives alone.
It also seems unlikely that anyone would disagree that the agent’s motive can
affect the circumstances he finds himself in and, hence, also the deontic status
of his actions. This appears to be what happens in the examples of an agent
having sex or getting married from a desire for money (14), as well as in the
“mood” examples (183–84). Surely, the fact that S is interested in researching
a particular phenomenon makes his circumstances relevantly different from
those of his colleagues who do not share this interest.
Sverdlik’s discussion of virtue ethics is far less thorough than his treatment
of consequentialism and deontology, and this is particularly unfortunate since
virtue ethics has many resources available when it comes to showing how motive
matters. Sverdlik considers Hursthouse’s account, namely, that:
(HC) An action X is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a completely
virtuous agent would characteristically X in C.
He claims that her account denies that motives have deontic relevance, and he
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appears to do so solely on the grounds that HC doesn’t include reference to
motive (130–34). This conclusion is far too hasty. Consider the case of an agent
who succeeds in helping someone in need but does so solely to impress his
mother. Has he performed a right action, according to HC? The answer will
depend on how demanding a view one holds of “what the completely virtuous
person does.” In particular, do the agent’s motive and attitude form part of
“what he does”? Among virtue ethicists who support something like HC, there
is some disagreement. According to Julia Annas, for example, the right thing
to do can range from what the learner does to what the truly virtuous person
does. The learner acts in a way that is dependent on the teaching of others,
and so he does the right thing only in the sense of doing something acceptable,
whereas the truly virtuous person acts on the basis of her own understanding
and does the right thing in the sense of doing something admirable. If we accept
that a completely virtuous agent would help the person in need, then the agent
acts rightly, even though he doesn’t act for the right motive or with the right
attitude. In this view, “right” is a thin concept; the claim that the agent acts
rightly does not tell us very much at all. For a richer evaluation, we have to turn
to the language of virtue (Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue [Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011], 16–51).
By contrast, according to a more demanding view, “what the agent does”
includes not only the action—helping someone in need—but also his reasons
or motive for acting, whether he knows what he is doing, as well as his attitudes
and feelings when he acts. This is the view supported by Hursthouse, who writes:
“What you do does not count as right unless it is what the virtuous agent would
do, say, ‘tell the truth, after much painful thought, for the right reasons, feeling
deep regret, having put in place all that can be done to support the person on
the receiving end afterwards.’ Only if you get all of that right are you entitled
to the satisfactory review of your own conduct. . . . Simply making the right
decision and telling the truth is not good enough to merit approval” (Rosalind
Hursthouse, “Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?” in Contemporary
Debates in Moral Theory, ed. J. Dreier [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006], 108–9).
Sverdlik therefore overlooks the way in which Aristotelian virtue ethicists can
account for the intuition that motive can affect rightness, for he mistakenly
assumes that they all support Aristotle’s distinction between a virtuous act and
action from virtue, which Sverdlik, following Ross, interprets as a distinction
between an action that is right and one that is well motivated (130). Virtue
ethicists tend to sidestep this distinction by instead speaking of acting well. When
they do use the term “right action,” it is often not in the sense of an action that
is obligatory or permissible but rather in the sense of an action that is good,
virtuous, or praiseworthy.
Finally, there is an unfortunate omission in the list of normative theories
that Sverdlik chooses to discuss. One prominent virtue ethicist who supports
the distinction between a right act and an act that is well motivated, while at
the same time allowing that motive can affect deontic status, is Christine Swanton
(Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 227–
48). Swanton develops a target-centered account of right action, and she uses
“right action” in the traditional sense of an action that is either obligatory or
permissible. Sverdlik mentions her work in a footnote (130 n. 12), where he
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admits to having some difficulty in fully accepting the contrast between Hurst-
house’s and Swanton’s theories. He notes that Swanton explicitly states that
motives can be deontically relevant but that her formal definition of rightness
categorizes many actions deontically without respect to their motives. This, pre-
sumably, is the reason why he doesn’t discuss Swanton’s account of rightness.
This is an important omission in a book dealing with the deontic relevance
of motives. A brief explanation is called for. Swanton defines a right action as
one that hits the target(s) of the contextually appropriate virtue(s). Hitting the
target of a virtue involves responding successfully to items in the field in which
the virtue operates, according to the aim or aims of the virtue. The targets of
a particular virtue depend on context. In contexts in which there is considerable
need, for example, one may be said to have performed a generous act if one
donates a large amount of money, even if the donation is made with bad grace.
However, in contexts that are more personal, in which one’s hostility or ill grace
is noticed by the recipients, the target of generosity is to alleviate need in the
right way, where ‘in the right way’ makes reference to the manner of giving and
even motivation (Swanton, Virtue Ethics, 236–37). In short, then, target-centered
virtue ethics allows for motive to make a deontic difference in much the same
(indirect) way that Sverdlik believes consequentialism does: rightness is not
defined in terms of motive; rather, it is defined in terms of some other feature
(consequences, hitting the target of virtue), which, it is then argued, is sometimes
affected by motive. However, Swanton’s account of success in action is much
more nuanced than the standard consequentialist view and should have been
considered more seriously.
Motive and Rightness suffers from a defect too often found in books on
normative theory, namely, that the author feels compelled to include discussion
of virtue ethics as the “third major normative theory” but then fails to do it
justice. Nevertheless, the book makes a valuable contribution to an often ne-
glected topic in normative ethics, and it will appeal to scholars who have a
particular interest in consequentialism and Kantianism, moral psychology, and
action theory.
Liezl van Zyl
University of Waikato
Taylor, Robert S. Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness.
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2011. Pp. 60. $74.95 (cloth).
Discussion of Rawls’s reliance on Kantian metaphysics has been largely dormant
for more than twenty years, following his explicit disavowal of it with the pub-
lication of his “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” (Philosophy and
Public Affairs 14 [1985]: 223–51). Rawls’s considered view was that his conception
of justice, Justice as Fairness, need not rely on contentious metaphysical claims
about the nature of the self. He argued that Justice as Fairness could be justified
by the fact that it is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines, of which the Kantian comprehensive doctrine is but one.
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